Public Diplomacy

Although I disagree with The New Yorker’s recent taste in cover art, I do think Hendrick Hertzberg is one of America’s best political commentators. Until we have some reliable polls on how Americans feel about Obama’s recent foreign travel, Hertzberg has the next best thing: how Americans ought to feel:

There has been much discussion of whether it will prove politically advantageous for Obama to have addressed a mile-long crowd of two hundred thousand happy Berliners in the golden early-evening sunlight. Berliners are Germans, and Germans are foreigners, and since well before John Kerry was demonized for knowing how to speak French it has been axiomatic that heartland Americans don’t like foreigners piping up about our elections, however much brainland Americans may disagree. Obama gained nothing in the polls during his nearly flawless, arguably triumphant grand tour. Still, after seven years during which, even among our closest allies, contempt for Bush bled into resentment of the country that returned him to office, one would have to be an awful grouch not to be gratified by the sight of a sea of delighted Europeans waving American flags instead of burning them and cheering an American politician instead of demonstrating against one.

Obama may yet gain some advantage in the U.S. from being the toast of Berlin. He hasn’t had much opportunity yet to tell Americans about his travels. He may find it useful to explain to voters what he saw and heard, and the advantages to Americans of having more of the world on our side. Barring other improvements, we should at least remember that there are some 6 million Americans residing outside the United States. In the past, these Americans tended not to vote, but even if only half of them wind up registering and voting this year, the impact would be significant. My hunch is that Obama’s message was not lost on them.

In a few hours, Barack Obama takes the stage in Berlin’s Tiergarten park for the kind of open-air public address that no American leader has made in Europe in a generation. As I mention in my “Election 2008″ blog, not since Ronald Reagan’s speech at the Berlin Wall in 1987 has there been anything quite like this in Berlin.

Remarkably, Obama is not even his party’s official candidate yet, let alone President. Nonetheless, he is being welcomed by European leaders and public as someone who could heal the rift in US-European relations, now as much a matter of public perception as a function of differences in policy.

John McCain’s strategy of attacking Obama’s relative inexperience in foreign affairs seems — for now — to have backfired. McCain challenged Obama to go to Iraq and Obama returned the challenge by conducting a tour of the region that turned out to be quite successful. McCain’s campaign is left trying to joke that the U.S. media are so infatuated with Obama that, in the words of the old Frankie Valli song, their reporting is “too good to be true.”

But it’s not just that the so-called “Mainstream Media” — American and now European — are sending valentines to Obama. Conservative voices, such as Anne Coulter, are falling out of love with McCain. The analytically-minded conservative, Robert Novak, acknowledges that McCain is losing ground.

The previous McCain line of attack was to accuse Obama of “flip-flopping.” But now it is McCain who will have to recalibrate his positions and tactics to avoid disillusionment among his Republican base.

The hardest sell, as always, is to attack the media. In truth, the media in the United States have treated McCain well, and have rewarded the access he has given them with generally positive coverage of his campaign. But attacking the media now will be seen as trying to shoot the messenger. A wounded cupid doesn’t take such offenses lightly.

Thankfully, we have a debate here — on the ideas behind Jim Glassman’s “War of Ideas.”

It is a topic worthy of debate, although to many it may seem like inside baseball.

It was Glassman, the new Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy at the US State Department, who earlier this month called for a “War of Ideas” by the U.S. Government to help defeat terrorism. It appears he was mainly talking about fighting Al Qaeda and its supporters.

According to Glassman, if the United States government could only “divert” such sympathizers or potential sympathizers away from radical, violent ideologies into other pursuits — even sports, computer games and the like — it would be a step in the right direction.

If only.

There are several problems with Glassman’s argument. First, by reducing the issue of violent anti-Americanism to essentially a cultural-consumer choice — he actually compares it to choosing Coke vs. Pepsi — he removes ideas from the “War of Ideas.” Just find an activity to distract people, he seems to be saying, and our problems are over.

It’s far from that simple. Those who pursue violence, not to mention suicide attacks, are motivated by a cause, not a pastime. Through argument or emotion, you must counter the appeal of the cause, not replace it with XBox or midnight basketball.
Second, it assumes that the US government has some way of creating or introducing “diversions” — whatever they might be — into mass populations around the world. America’s protagonists and ideological opponents may believe or sow the belief that the U.S. government has such powers, but history and common sense suggest otherwise.

Third, it misunderstands the important assets of “soft power” which are medium- to long-term in nature. American culture, science, sports, ideas have tremendous appeal — but as a long-term pattern of influence and the result of America’s overall interaction with the world. The job of U.S. officials carrying out public diplomacy is to draw attention to and utilize this immense power, but with an appreciation that America’s soft power has appeal precisely because it is democratic, private, and not directed by government.

My co-blogger is right to point out (below) that when we talk about public diplomacy, we’re not directly talking about foreign policy. True. But errant or unsuccessful policies cannot be salvaged by public diplomacy alone.

Whether art, skill or tactic, public diplomacy works when it makes policies better understood and improves the chances that they may win acceptance overseas.  If Glassman’s approach is also to seek to discredit radicals who foment terror, well enough, but perhaps this is best done by those who have greater credibility with the target audiences.   Whether public diplomat or behind-the-scenes communication strategist, Glassman will be embedded within the Bush Administration for only six months.  Hardly enough time to accomplish either mission.

From a July 2008 Foreign Policy Magazine web exclusive interview with Karim Sadjadpour is an associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace:

FP: What do Iranians think about the U.S. presidential election and John McCain versus Barack Obama?

KS: There’s far more intrigue about Obama than about McCain. Apart from the fact that he advocates dialogue with Iran, he’s African-American and his middle name is Hussein, who is the paramount figure in Shiite history and culture. If Obama were to win, it would be much more difficult for Iran to constantly paint the United States as this grand oppressor. It’s interesting to note that a few days after the hostages were taken at the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, the Iranians released all the women and blacks because they said these groups were historically oppressed by Americans.

An Obama victory in November could tremendously change the dynamics in U.S.-Iran relations. If you’re a hard-liner in Tehran and you survive in isolation, like Ayatollah Khamenei, it presents far more of a quandary for you to have a president in Washington who says “Let’s be friends” than one who says “Let’s be enemies” and essentially continue the status quo. I would wager the vast majority of Iran’s political elite, who do want to see some sort of reconciliation, support Obama. But then you have a small, but powerful minority who survive in isolation, much like Fidel Castro in Cuba. They see Iran opening up to the world as a threat to their interests, and I’m sure they would much prefer John McCain to be president.

Thanks to Steven Corman for his insightful response to my recent post about Undersecretary Glassman’s remarks about the “War of Ideas” (WoI). He made some very good points.

But I am disheartened by the argument that there is no way to changes people’s attitudes about the US unless we change our policies. Changing our policies is no doubt the way to make the quickest and biggest effect on foreigners’ attitudes of the US. But if only policies changes effect changes in opinion of the US, why are we bothering conducting public diplomacy in the first place?  

I would say that, among other reasons, we bother to conduct public diplomacy because the US also interacts with global publics in ways that don’t involve its policies.  To give a relevant example, a lack of concern for global opinion of the US by the US is a great way to send a signal that the rest of the world does not show up on our radar screen, that we operate detached from what’s important to the rest of the world.  

Furthermore, recent polling shows that global publics not only reject American policies, they also reject the present character of American leadership. They don’t reject our values, rather they don’t see us living up to the values that we have projected into the international sphere. This problem differs from publics simply disliking our policies, as global perceptions of our character are much more difficult for us to change than our policies. This opposition to American leadership will make initiating multi-lateral cooperation on the issues that concern our national interests very difficult. 

In regards to the WoI I mean to say that global opinion of the US should be a measuring stick that can help us gauge our progress in this war, rather then be confined to a separate “hat” in the PD closet. What worries me about Glassman’s remarks is that he doesn’t seem to put a lot of stock in the idea that the less people dislike the US, the less socially acceptable it will be to commit acts of terror against us. I get the reasoning behind not getting them to love us but rather getting them to not like violence. That is one way to approach it and it wish it the utmost success—but let’s not throw the baby out with the bathwater. 

In the end, I am glad that Glassman’s remarks could stimulate a healthy debate. I am also glad that a seasoned public-diplomacy watcher such as Professor Corman has faith in the new Undersecretary.  I am happy to continue the debate about the WoI as the Undersecretary’s term wears on.

Thanks to my fellow blogger for bringing up the newly-confirmed Undersecretary of State for Public Diplomacy (PD) James K Glassman’s remarks at the Washington Institute for Middle East Policy (view video here).

Clearly Glassman will be a more than competent placeholder until the next administration names its own Public Diplomacy czar. But some elements of his remarks leave me deeply troubled, even for the short time he will occupy this office.

Glassman began by describing the mission of Public Diplomacy as the “achievement of the national interest” by “understanding, engaging, informing and influencing foreign publics.” He said: “Our aim is to influence foreign publics to make it easier to achieve US foreign policy goals. The key goals today are to diminish the threat to Americans and the rest of the world posed by Islamic fundamentalism and weapons of mass destruction. And to help people around the world achieve freedom…”

Nothing controversial here.

Glassman then described his personal role as Undersecretary as “dual hatted.” One hat entails overseeing the traditional tools of public diplomacy at the State Department, its international broadcasting programs, and its “crown jewels—” its educational and cultural programs. The second entails service as the “supreme allied commander” in the “War of Ideas” (WoI), which he states is a government-wide, inter-agency initiative, lead by the Undersecretary for PD.

The aim of the WoI, as Glassman stated that day and wrote in a June 24 opinion piece published in the Wall Street Journal, is to: “Create an environment hostile to violent extremism, especially by severing links between al Qaeda and like-minded groups and their target audiences.”

So far so good–important duties await Glassman while wearing either of his hats. The problems arise when he defines what the WoI doesn’t entail:

“Unlike traditional functions of public diplomacy like education and cultural exchanges, the aim of war of ideas is not to persuade foreign populations to adopt more favorable views of the US and its policies. Instead, the WoI tries to ensure that negative sentiments and day-to-day grievances toward the US and its allies do not manifest themselves in the form of violent extremism.”

He continues: “Let me put it another way. In the WoI our core task is not to fix foreigners’ perceptions of the United States. Those perceptions are important, and I would be happy to address the issue of America’s image in the question and answer period. But America’s image, and indeed the United States itself, is not at the center a the WoI.”

Huh??! Does “Death to America” ring a bell? How could negative views of the United States NOT play a role in violent extremism? Osama bin Laden wants death to America. 9/11 happened to Americans. Al Qaeda members are coming to Iraq to fight America. Disdain for America sticks to violent extremism like white on rice.

Rather than the WoI being about the US, Glassman said: “Instead we need to recognize that there is a complex multisided battle going on in Muslim societies for power. We cannot be a bystander, and simply step aside and watch them slug it out for power. This battle effects the US directly, and was responsible for the deaths of 3,000 people one day seven years ago.”

Are we really to believe that the “War of Ideas” is not actually a battle between our ideas and their ideas (like it was during the Cold War, when the term was coined), rather between their own ideas within their societies?

This misunderstanding of the root causes of violent extremism is perilous, especially coming from the “supreme commander” (though he has company). It de-links the US, the image of itself that it projects, and more importantly its policies, from the behavior of violent extremists—when these are the very factors that the US can directly manipulate in order to persuade extremists to change their behavior.

It’s not that Glassman and company don’t think negative views of the US are a problem—they just don’t think they have anything to do with the WoI. By the “We’re Coke, They’re Pepsi” analogy, Glassman means that the aim of the WoI is not about getting the extremists to like US, rather it’s about getting them to not like violence. But America and violent extremism are not two mutually-exclusive options in a vending machine. Beliefs, perceptions and actions are all intricately related.

Not only is it flawed, Glassman’s conception of the WoI is also inconsistent with what he defined as the main goal of PD. Later in the question and answer period, when he finally addressed the US image problem, Glassman conceded: “Negative attitudes make it difficult to conduct US foreign policy.” So if  PD’s aim, as he stated, “is to influence foreign publics to make it easier to achieve US foreign policy goals,” and if winning the WoI is the main US foreign policy goal the PD czar is responsible for, he should be working to remove any obstacles that keep him from achieving it.

I do not mean to come down too harshly on Glassman. Rather, I see the problem stemming from this new division of the Undersecretary’s mission into two “hats”—“traditional” public diplomacy activities under one hat, commanding the WoI under the other. This erects an unnecessary wall between two important tasks that should consistently support and build off each other.

True, a visit to an Al Qaeda training camp by Cal Ripken is not going to persuade jihadists to drop their guns and play baseball. Glassman has made this point clear. But projecting a positive image of the US to the many skeptics around the world (those with a propensity to act violently or not) is, if not the primary responsibility of the Undersecretary, at least a task that comes under both of these two new “hats.” A failure to recognize this will only prolong the “War of Ideas” and the US image problem.

After a long pause, there is activity once again on the front lines of America’s official public diplomacy. Part of this is a seasonal phenomenon — every summer, the little-known U.S. Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy issues a report with recommendations, usually appealing for more resources for the State Department’s public diplomacy operations. But this summer, in addition to the Commission’s recommendations, there is a provocative new analysis of what the U.S. worldwide public diplomacy strategy ought to be, provided by James Glassman, the new Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy.

Glassman, who recently took over the job vacated by Karen Hughes last December, argued last week in presentations before the Council on Foreign Relations, and before the Washington Institute, that his objective in the waning months of the Bush Administration would be to create a sort of ideological “diversion” to derail the appeal of Al Qaeda and similar terrorist groups. He compared it to a simple consumer choice:

Think of it this way: we’re Coke; they’re Pepsi. Our job is not to get people to drink Coke in this instance, but to get people not to drink Pepsi. They can drink anything else they want. They can drink milk, ginger ale, tomato juice. We think that ultimately they will come around to Coke; that is to say, come around to principles of freedom and democracy. But in the meantime, we want them to stay away from Pepsi — that is to say, violent extremism.

Despite the consumerist analogy, Glassman is of a more military bent. He’s clearly looking for a hard edge to soft power. The war of ideas for him is not a figure of speech, but an actual fight. He wants to give ammo to the right parties in the “battle” within Muslim society. This approach doesn’t leave much room for subtlety. Today the extremist Muslims, tomorrow the Russians and Chinese. As he puts it:

The shorthand for this policy is diversion — powerful and lasting diversion, the channeling of potential recruits away from violence with the attractions of entertainment, culture, literature, music technology, sports, education, business and culture, in addition to politics and religion.

Glassman seems to suggest that if we could only distract and divert foreign populations with some sort of new cultural commodity, that the appeal of terrorist ideologies would dissipate. This is a very different approach than usually employed by public diplomacy professionals, who have tended to emphasize American values and institutions rather than products.

Glassman, who was previously head of the Broadcast Board of Governors (the oversight board for USG-sponsored foreign broadcasting), has announced that he intends to give “focus and emphasis” to his role as “supreme allied commander in the war of ideas” — the phrase used by Sen. Lieberman in presenting Glassman for confirmation last January.

He does not have much time to execute his call to arms — whatever instruments they may turn out to be. Karen Hughes, his predecessor, has just signed on with Burson-Marsteller, which, given its importance in shaping the campaign strategies of candidates in this election year, may exert more influence on the long-term direction of U.S. public diplomacy.

José María Peredo Pombo, a professor of International Relations at the European University in Madrid, penned an opinion piece about Senator Obama in the online journal “Forum For A Safe Democracy.” In the piece titled “The Multipolar World of Barack Obama,” Pombo gives a historical take on past American Presidents who have tried to affect change:

“To change America and the world at the same time has been a common dream of presidents of the United States, but few have achieved it.

Roosevelt caught American society when it fell into the depression of the 1930’s, but he did not have the ability to contain the spread of totalitarianism in Europe. Truman and Eisenhower launched the domestic finance machine and the international economy, but failed to stop the arms race that built up the nuclear arsenals of both the Americans and the communists and led to nuclear proliferation in China, France, and Great Britain. Johnson built the Great Society of the ‘60’s based on civil rights, but built and maintained an aggressive and uncontrolled foreign policy in Vietnam and the Far East.”

As for the future, Pombo advises:

“Obama should understand that one cannot build a strong and comprehensive foreign policy without the support of the many countries and alliances that would contribute to the regaining of multilateralism, an issue on which the senator has not been very vocal….”

I will be on vacation for the majority of July, so I thought I would leave you with a few timely resources on foreign policy and the US Presidential campaign.

1)  Senator Chuck Hagel (R, NE), as part of his recent book tour, spoke at the Brookings Institution last week about “U.S. Foreign Policy and the Presidential Campaign.” Senator Hagel, a long-time member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, examines the global challenges that the next president will inherit and the responsibilities of the presidential candidates to address these challenges.

2) Also from the Brookings Institution is a new article by foreign policy experts Peter Singer and Hady Amr titled ‘To Win the “War on Terror,’ We Must First Win the ‘War of Ideas’: Here’s How.” Originally published in the academic journal the Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, the analysis addresses the critical role that public diplomacy plays in improving the deteriorating image of the United States in the Muslim world. From the abstract:

“The authors argue that both public diplomacy and policies, including those on civil liberties, are vital to U.S. success in the war on terrorism and that the next U.S. president must designate this effort as a matter of highest national security importance. Many in the Muslim world believe that the war on terrorism is essentially a war on Islam; this view impedes the success of an effective foreign policy strategy. Previous efforts of public diplomacy have lacked funding, energy, focus, and an integrated strategy. The authors define six principles to improve America’s security through winning the war of ideas, including addressing civil liberties concerns, and engaging diverse constituencies in the Muslim world. Finally, the authors describe ten public diplomacy initiatives to improve U.S.–Muslim world relations.”

3) Robert Dreyfuss writes in the Nation magazine about “Obama’s Evolving Foreign Policy.” He argues:

“Perhaps nowhere else are expectations as high for what an Obama presidency will mean as in foreign policy, where many Americans–and most of the world–are holding their breath awaiting the end of George W. Bush’s wrecking-ball approach to world affairs. In some important areas, Obama would alter or reverse course…

…But in many respects, Obama seems likely to preside over a restoration of the bipartisan consensus that governed foreign policy during the cold war and the 1990s, updated for a post-9/11 world. That conclusion arises from an in-depth examination of the Illinois senator’s views as well as dozens of interviews with foreign policy experts, including lengthy exchanges with the core group of Obama’s foreign policy team and other participants in his task forces on the military, Iraq and the Middle East. It’s also based on a careful review of speeches and position papers, Obama’s 2007 article in Foreign Affairs and a key chapter, “The World Beyond Our Borders,” in his book The Audacity of Hope.

All this suggests there is a gap between Obama’s inspirational speeches and the actual policies he supports. “So far, what you’re seeing is rhetoric that we can make bold changes in our foreign policy,” says John Cavanagh, director of the Institute for Policy Studies. “But when he lays out specifics, it’s not as transformational as the rhetoric.” Will Marshall, director of the right-leaning Progressive Policy Institute of the Democratic Leadership Council, agrees. “On most of the details, he’s aligned with the general Democratic consensus,” Marshall says. Says Tom Hayden, the veteran activist and former California state senator, “At best, he will be a gradualist.”

4) An articleauthored by Derek Chollet and James Goldgeier published in the National Interest yesterday argues that although Senator John McCain “has assembled a diverse group of advisors for his campaign, should he win the presidency this fall, he will have to choose between two markedly different approaches to guiding America in the world.”

Their argument goes: “In the aftermath of the Bush administration, particularly the impact of the war in Iraq, conservative politicians and policy intellectuals are again debating the nature of the global order, the purpose and use of American power, and what, if anything, is required to legitimize the exercise of that power, particularly military force. What is striking is the extent to which the divide between the two broad groupings in the McCain campaign (the pragmatists or realists on one hand and the idealists or neoconservatives on the other) resembles the divisions that had emerged in the closing days of the George H. W. Bush administration…

McCain’s proposal to create a League of Democracies is an interesting hybrid of the two perspectives, one that symbolizes his effort to be a “realistic idealist” (this proposal also has the support of many prominent liberal thinkers). It would rely on U.S. leadership of a multilateral organization based on a community of values. But even that idea demonstrates the likely limits of collaboration among the two groups. Realists see a world where the United States needs to reach out to major nondemocracies such as China and Russia for assistance in combating a number of pressing threats, especially terrorism.

The idealists, meanwhile, believe that the lack of democracy in China and Russia is itself a major problem and places real limits on America’s ability to engage in any sort of meaningful cooperation with them. These are fundamental differences in approach. This is why Eagleburger, now an advisor to McCain, recently told the New York Times that “it may be too strong a term to say a fight is going on over John McCain’s soul . . . [but] I am convinced there is at least going to be an attempt.”

If McCain wins the presidency, then presumably we will hear more about how “realistic idealism” navigates these problems, but many observers predict a foreign policy of incoherence and division. The moment a President McCain starts going after leaders in Beijing and Moscow for their authoritarian ways, the realists will panic and look to the American business community to prevent a breakdown in relations. And if he goes easy on the Chinese, as some accused Bill Clinton of doing during his presidency, the neoconservatives will feel betrayed and start agitating, as they did in the 1990s, for conservatives to develop a “neo-Reaganite” foreign policy.

Ultimately, McCain will find that on issues such as climate change or Iran where he needs Russia and China, he will have to deal with them. He won’t be able to kick Russia out of the G-8, as he has said the United States should consider doing. Standing up for values can (and should) remain an important part of foreign policy, but McCain will inevitably have to compromise if he wants to make progress to curb North Korea’s nuclear ambitions, for example….”

5) Finally, I recently reworked a post originally published on this blog into a longer analysis. It was published by the Foreign Policy Association’s Great Decision Analysis series, as well as by AlterNet, Reuter’s progressive news arm.

Have a great holiday weekend!

John McCain’s airborne version of the “Straight Talk Express” flew off to Columbia yesterday — and it wasn’t Columbia, South Carolina, but the actual country of Columbia. Both candidates, in fact, are taking advantage of a break in the political calendar at home to do some foreign travel. For Obama, who is about to set off for Western Europe, Iraq and Afghanistan, it will be his first foreign travel after nearly 18 months of constant campaigning at home.

This will be the first time for foreign leaders and publics to take the measure of our candidates since they won their parties’ nominations, and it will be the first time that we in America can judge how nominees McCain and Obama — one of them the next President — present themselves abroad.

Given the excitement that Obama has generated in many countries overseas, it will be interesting to see how his activities are reported and commented on in foreign media. I can already report, having just returned from six weeks in Europe, that European mass media give Obama extensive coverage, sometimes as much as they give their own political leaders. Often this is directly lifted from American media and reflects an intense curiosity about Obama’s personality. (When Rolling Stone published an article on Obama’s choice of music for his iPod, Italy’s Corriere della Sera gave it major play, contrasting it with the country music that the NYT found on George W. Bush’s iPod a while back.)

John McCain may not inspire such fevered attention. Some of the U.S. cable commentators were amazed that McCain would travel to Columbia to defend the U.S.-Columbia free trade agreement that has become so controversial at home — even in his own party. But this is classic McCain, who is intent on building his appeal based on an image of candor and “straight talk,” which, at the end of the long campaign to come, may prove his most effective tactic, at home and abroad, for countering Obama’s charisma.